We use the merger of BlackRock with Barclays Global Investors (BGI) as an event to study how changes in ownership concentration affect the investment behavior of financial institutions and the cross-section of stocks worldwide. We find that other institutional investors re-balance away from stocks that experience a large increase in ownership concentration due to the pre-merger portfolio overlap between BlackRock and BGI. Over the same period, institutional ownership migrates towards comparable stocks not held by BGI funds prior to the merger. The re-allocation of institutional ownership has price impact. Stocks that experience large increases in ownership concentration due to the merger experience negative returns that do not fully revert. These stocks also become permanently less liquid and less volatile. We argue that the merger is exogenous with respect to the characteristics of the stocks held by BGI funds prior to the merger. This allows for a causal interpretation of the results and points to strong strategic complementarities associated with large, global asset management firms that may lead to financial fragility. We speculate that financial fragility is driven by fear of future, possibly idiosyncratic firm events and not necessarily by actual firm events per se.
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"In 25 years, BlackRock has become the world's biggest investor. Is its dominance a problem?"
Despite the ominous title, the cover story of the December 7, 2013 issue of The Economist took quite a conciliatory tone arguing that "If the regulators' concern is to avoid a repeat of the last crisis, they are barking up the wrong tree. Unlike banks, whose loans and deposits go on their balance-sheets as assets and liabilities, BlackRock is a mere manager of other people's money. […] Whereas banks tumble if their assets lose even a fraction of their value, BlackRock can pass on any shortfalls to its clients, and withstand far greater shocks. In fact, by being on hand to pick up assets cheaply from distressed sellers, an unleveraged asset manager arguably stabilizes markets rather than disrupting them."
This logic is in line with the standard folk-theorem in finance. Since BlackRock does not invest on its own account, but just indirectly on behalf of customers, there is little reason to associate BlackRock with systemic risk.
1 In this paper, we challenge this logic and argue that the emergence of BlackRock impacts all the other investors who need to strategically account for the "big elephant in the pond" that could potentially "rock the boat" in the future.
The sheer size of BlackRock means that the firm is now the single largest shareholder in a large number of firms worldwide. Prior research has identified a number of possible effects that can follow from such a large concentration of ownership. On the one hand, concentrated ownership can be associated with higher stock volatility because idiosyncratic shocks to the concentrated investor base are not diversified away once these shocks occur (Greenwood and Thesmar (2011) ). On the other hand, if other investors are aware of the possible impact of concentrated ownership, they will strategically take it into account ex-ante. Strategic considerations of this kind can then lead to changes in the portfolio allocations that may impact stock markets even in the absence of actual shocks.
For example, if a single investor accumulates a large stake in IBM, other investors may decide to strategically change their exposure to IBM as well. They may decide to re-balance away from IBM in order to avoid any future exposure to the idiosyncratic shocks of the single investor that could force a large and sudden sale of IBM stock (a "fire sale"). While the actual occurrence of such a fire sale directly impacts the stock price of IBM when it takes place, the mere "fear" of it can motivate investors to rebalance, affecting the stock price of IBM already today.
While it has already been shown that concentrated ownership may lead to financial fragility (Greenwood and Thesmar (2011)), not much evidence exists on the ex-ante impact of a change in ownership concentration on the behavior of investors in the market. However, identifying the ex-ante 2 effect is empirically challenging because it involves the identification of strategic interactions among investors, which is plagued by endogeneity problems (Manski's (1993) "reflection problem" 2 ).
In this paper, we overcome these issues by exploiting an exogenous shock to the concentration of ownership in the cross-section of stocks worldwide. In 2009, BlackRock acquired Barclays Global Investors (BGI) to become the world's largest asset manager. This single merger fulfills all the criteria of a natural experiment to study how a change in the degree of ownership concentration affects the behavior of other investors and stock markets. First, the merger is unprecedented in scale. The combined entities oversaw about $2.7 trillion in assets under management at that time. This makes the event impactful.
Second, the event affected a large number of global stocks to varying degrees, providing a necessary source of cross-sectional variation. We estimate that stocks representing over 60% of world market capitalization were directly affected because they were held in both BlackRock and BGI-managed portfolios prior to the merger. Third, the acquisition was exogenous to the characteristics of the stocks held in the portfolios of BlackRock and BGI funds. Barclays sold BGI in order to raise funds to strengthen its balance sheet in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis to avoid a possible future bailout by the UK government. BlackRock acquired BGI in order to establish a foothold in the fastgrowing market of passive investment products (ETFs). This allows us to give a causal interpretation to the merger-induced changes in ownership concentration and to the associated peer and stock market effects.
We lay out two competing hypotheses. The first hypothesis, which we label the "fire sale risk hypothesis", is based on the strategic interactions among investors in financial markets that take into account the possibility of future fire sales and the strategic complementarities associated with them. Such complementarities arise when the actions of market players reinforce each other. 3 For example, they are at the core of models on bank runs (e.g., Diamond and Dybvig (1983) ) where the decision of one depositor to withdraw funds induces other depositors to withdraw funds first for fear of depleting bank reserves, leading to a bank run. The same intuition extends to asset management if a concentrated investor experiences an idiosyncratic shock (e.g., large redemption requests) that induces a fire sale. Such a situation can lead to strategic complementarities if other investors try to pre-empt the sale by selling first or if the price impact of the initial sale forces other investors to follow suit. Therefore, in the presence of 3 strategic interactions, a change in ownership concentration will induce other investors to re-balance away from the affected stocks in order to hedge the risk of future fire sales.
This motive is especially true when the other investors face investment constraints (e.g., margin
constraints, short investment horizons, volatile flows, open-end structures, etc., Shleifer and Vishny (1997) ) 4 or when they hold the affected stocks primarily for liquidity reasons (i.e., when these other investors are "liquidity" or "noise traders"). In these cases, they are especially vulnerable to potential future fire sales. It is less true for investors who hold the affected stocks for information reasons ("informed investors"). These will be more reluctant to re-balance as it would mean giving up their information. As a result, under this hypothesis, changes in ownership concentration lead primarily to a reduced presence of investors who assign a high importance to liquidity considerations. The literature has traditionally called them as "liquidity" traders (or, more precisely, "strategic" or "discretionary" liquidity traders, Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992) ).
From this argument, the motive to strategically re-balance away from affected stocks should lead to a negative price impact on the stocks. Further, the market microstructure literature has shown how a lower presence of liquidity traders is associated with lower liquidity (because they trade for liquidity reasons and not based on information) and lower volatility (because price changes due to liquidity trades impact volatility rather than the mean of stock returns). 5 Therefore, in the words of Bernardo and Welch (2004) :
"Liquidity runs and crises are not caused by liquidity shocks per se, but by the fear of future liquidity shocks."
The alternative hypothesis is based on the informational role provided by concentrated ownership.
The presence of a large owner can send a positive signal about the quality of the firm (e.g., Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2005) ). In this case, other investors will re-balance towards the stock in order to copy and benefit from the behavior of the concentrated owner. Under this alternative hypothesis, concerns about future liquidity shock play a secondary role only, if at all. To the contrary, such a motive leads to more market depth, higher liquidity and a positive price impact due to the increased buying pressure triggered by the motive to re-balance. We will call this alternative hypothesis the "information hypothesis".
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These two hypothesis therefore differ both in their predictions on the investment responses of other investors and in the resulting impact on stock returns, liquidity, and volatility. We test them against the null hypothesis that changes in ownership concentration do not lead to strategic considerations by other investors.
We start by documenting portfolio changes by institutional investors other than BlackRock or BGI in response to the merger between the two entities. We find that, over the second half of 2009, institutional investors re-balance away from stocks that experience a large increase in ownership concentration due to the high institutional ownership attributable to BGI funds prior to the merger ("BGI-ownership"). As a result, "residual institutional ownership" -i.e., the institutional ownership attributable to all institutions except BlackRock or BGI -of stocks with high BGI-ownership drops relative to residual institutional ownership of stocks with low BGI-ownership.
The effect is quantitatively sizeable. The growth rate of residual institutional ownership falls by about 2%-age points per STD of BGI-ownership prior to the merger. This implies that residual institutional ownership for stocks with low BGI-ownership prior to the merger ("bottom quintile stocks") grows more than twice as fast as residual institutional ownership for stocks with high BGI-ownership prior to the merger ("top quintile stocks") over the second half of 2009. 6 We confirm this result in crosssectional regressions, a difference-in-difference design and various fixed effect specifications.
We find no evidence that this relative drop in residual institutional ownership reverts following the completion of the merger, suggesting that the increase in ownership concentration due to the merger reflects a permanent increase in the risk of future fire sales as opposed to a temporary effect caused by front-running of competing institutions in anticipation of merger-induces portfolio rebalancing by BlackRock.
Moreover, sample splits show that the effect is concentrated in stocks that were also held by BlackRock funds prior to the merger. For stocks not held by BlackRock funds prior to the merger, the effect is nil. Further, the effect is concentrated in illiquid stocks and in small-cap stocks -i.e., in stocks in which liquidity considerations seem to play a larger role.
These initial findings give support to the "fire sale risk hypothesis". We develop the hypothesis further and ask two follow-up questions. First, which institutions respond more aggressively to the merger? Second, where does residual institutional ownership migrate to?
First, we expect some degree of heterogeneity in how aggressive different institutional investors respond to the changes in ownership concentration induced by the merger. For example, Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2013) show that strategic complementarities play a more important role for funds with illiquid 5 portfolios and performance-sensitive flows. We confirm this idea and find that the effect is stronger among institutional investors with more volatile flows and higher flow-performance sensitivities. Also, consistent with the notion that "liquidity traders" are more likely to re-balance away from affected stocks than "informed investors", we find that the effect is stronger for institutional investors with shorter investment horizons and that are less likely informed.
Second, institutional investors are frequently subject to a mandate to stay invested and many are benchmarked to broad market indices. This suggests that residual institutional ownership is likely reallocated to comparable stocks that were not held by BGI funds prior to the merger. We employ multiple selection algorithms to identify potential matching stocks to the stocks affected by the merger and indeed find that the matching stocks experience a disproportionate increase in institutional ownership over the second half of 2009. The growth rate of residual institutional ownership is 2 to 11%-age points higher in the matching stocks compared to the actual stocks. The difference is especially pronounced for the matching stocks to the stocks that experience a large increase in ownership concentration due to the merger ("top-quintile stocks"). For such stocks, the difference in the growth rate reaches up to 29%-age points, implying that the growth rate in residual institutional ownership is about 10 times higher in the matching stocks than in the actual stocks that are directly affected by the merger. This shows that fund managers rebalance into stocks that are as close as possible to the ones they divest from, with only small changes to their overall asset allocation strategy.
Next, we turn to the stock market effects of the BlackRock-BGI merger. We focus on the impact on stock returns, liquidity, and volatility. The "fire sales risk hypothesis" predicts negative stock price effects as well as both lower liquidity and lower volatility for stocks that experience an increase in ownership concentration due to the merger. The "information hypothesis" predicts the opposite.
To test these predictions, we first refine our testing strategy. For the analysis of peer effects, we are constrained by semi-annual holdings information for global institutions. For the analysis of stock market effects, we do not face this restriction and therefore conduct the analysis at the monthly frequency. This allows us to more precisely identify the periods when any stock market effects manifest themselves.
Therefore, we define three key moments in the evolution of the merger. The announcement in June 2009
that BlackRock is the designated buyer of BGI, the anti-trust approval by the European Commission in September 2009 and the completion of the merger in December 2009. In section I, we give a more detailed account of the evolution of the merger.
The results further support the "fire sales risk hypothesis". We find strong negative effects on returns, liquidity, and volatility of stocks that experience a large increase in ownership concentration due to the merger. These effects mostly take place once the merger receives anti-trust approval from the None of these effects fully reverts after the merger completes. While the liquidity and volatility effects are already detectable after the merger announcement, the return effect only manifests itself once the merger receives anti-trust approval. Also, the effects are robust to multiple fixed effect specifications, and, importantly, to controlling for the impact of residual institutional ownership. Consistent with the previous results, the effects are concentrated in stocks held by BlackRock funds prior to the merger and in illiquid and small-cap stocks.
These results contribute to several strands of the literature. First, we contribute to the literature on strategic interactions in financial markets including the literature on strategic complementarities and global games (e.g., Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) , Morris and Shin (1998), Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004) , Rochet and Vives (2004) , Dasgupta (2004) , Goldstein and Pauzner (2004, 2005) ) as well as the literature on financial runs (e.g., Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , Bernardo and Welch (2004) ). We provide direct evidence on strategic interactions that are empirically notoriously difficult to identify, as acknowledged by Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2013) who provide indirect evidence using mutual fund flows.
Second, we contribute to the literature on the impact of concentrated ownership (e.g., Greenwood
and Thesmar (2011), Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2005) ) on the stock market. Our experiment based on the merger between BlackRock and BGI provides an exogenous source of variation of ownership concentration in a global cross-section of stocks. This allows us to give a causal interpretation to the documented effects and contributes to the debate on how concentrated ownership affects stock markets.
More importantly, the fact that we are able to observe the ex-ante strategic behavior of other investors (i.e., before any idiosyncratic shocks to BlackRock or any fire sales occur) allows us to identify the exante impact of concentrated ownership on stock markets, clearly differentiating this paper from the literature on financial fragility that focusses on the impact of actual fire sales, once they happen. Azar, Schmalz and Tecu (2015) analyze the impact of common ownership on product market policies of airlines. They also use the merger of BlackRock and BGI as an exogenous source of variation in ownership concentration.
Third, we contribute to the literature on liquidity and liquidity-driven trading in financial markets (e.g., Kyle (1985) , Subrahmanyam (1991) , Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992) , Back (1992) , Back, Cao and Willard (2000) , Amihud (2002) , Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) ) and to the literature on financial fire sales and limits to arbitrage (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1997 , 2011 ), Bernardo and Welch (2004 , Coval and Stafford (2007), Ellul, Jotikasthira and Lundblad (2010) ). With respect to the first, we 7 provide direct evidence on the link between the behavior of investors and the resulting effects on liquidity and volatility. With respect to the second, we clarify between the impact of financial fire sales when they occur and the ex-ante response by investors who act in anticipation of such events.
Finally, our results have important normative implications. On the one hand, they suggest that concentrated ownership need not exacerbate stock volatility but may in fact cause the opposite at the cost of lower liquidity. On the other hand, they suggest that large asset managers may contribute to systemic risk and that other market participants are aware of it and condition their actions accordingly.
We proceed as follows. In section I, we give a detailed account of the BlackRock-BGI merger. In section II, we describe the data and main variables that we use and explain our empirical design.
In section III, we analyze peer effects and examine how the merger impacts the investment behavior of global financial institutions. In section IV, we study the stock market effects of the merger. In section V, we present further robustness tests and discussions. A brief conclusion follows.
I. The BlackRock-BGI Merger
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the initial owner of Barclays Global Investors ("BGI"), the UK-based bank Barclays PLC ("Barclays"), had to sustain large loan losses that substantially weakened the bank's balance sheet. In order to strengthen the bank's capital ratios, calm investors, and avoid risking a bailout by the UK government, Barclays announced on March 16, 2009 its intention to sell the iShares unit of BGI. This unit was (and still is) the leading global provider of exchange-traded funds ("ETFs").
On April 9, 2009, Barclays announced the sale of the iShares unit to the private equity group CVC Capital ("CVC") for $4.4 billion. However, the deal included a "go shop" provision that would allow another bidder to make a higher offer for iShares within 45 days in exchange for a $175 million break-up fee to be paid to CVC.
On June 11, 2009, BlackRock Inc. ("BlackRock") announced that it had agreed to acquire all of BGI for $13.5 billion. The deal would make BlackRock the world's largest money manager with assets under management of $2.7 trillion at that time. According to the "go shop" provision, the announcement left an additional 5 days to CVC to make a counter offer with no additional bidder being allowed to submit another competing offer.
On June 18, 2009, the "go-shop" period expired without a counter-offer from CVC. argue that the merger between BlackRock and BGI was exogenous to the aggregate portfolio holdings and the characteristics of these holdings. This allows us to give a causal interpretation to the effects we describe in this study.
[ Figure I here]
As a first motivation of why the merger between BlackRock and BGI likely impacted stock markets, we plot the cumulative risk-adjusted returns of stocks with above-median BGI-ownership prior to the merger and the cumulative risk-adjusted returns of the matching stocks with similar characteristics (the matching stocks we use in section III) together with the main event dates in figure I.
While the returns on those two portfolios do not significantly differ in the pre-merger period, they start diverging once BlackRock announces the acquisition of BGI in June 2009. The divergence grows markedly once the merger receives anti-trust approval. At that point, the returns of stocks with abovemedian BGI-ownership prior to the merger drop markedly. After the merger completes in December 2009, the returns of the two portfolios revert to a parallel trend. This suggests that the merger had a strong impact on stock markets that we will investigate in more detail.
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II. Data, Main Variables and Empirical Design
A. Data Sources
We obtain our data from several sources. We collect semi-annual (January to June and July to DataStream industry classification to assign stocks to industries as in Bekaert et al. (2007 Bekaert et al. ( , 2011 . Third, , are defined as the per period stock return of stock j in excess of the return of a domestic characteristics-matched portfolio based on size, value and momentum as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997).
Next, we consider three measures of stock liquidity. First, , is defined as the log of total number of shares traded for stock j in period t multiplied by the beginning of period stock price. Second, , is defined as the total number of shares traded for stock j in period t divided by the beginning of period shares outstanding. Third, ℎ , is defined as the Amihud (2002) measure of stock illiquidity that is computed from daily volume, price and returns data.
Finally, for stock volatility, we consider two measures. First, , is defined as the standard deviation of daily stock returns of stock j in period t. Second, , is defined as the standard deviation of daily residuals from a first-stage regression of daily excess stock returns on domestic market, size, value and momentum factors.
We also construct a number of stock level control variables as follows. ℎ , is defined as change in institutional ownership in stock j in period t attributable to trades by BlackRock funds. ℎ , is computed as the change in portfolio weight of stock j in the global market portfolio in period t where the global market portfolio is defined to include all stocks in the WorldScope database.
, is the log of the beginning of period market capitalization of stock j.
, is the 6-month trailing return of stock j. , is the log of the book-to-market ratio of stock j where we divide book value of equity of the most recent fiscal year end (at least one quarter lagged) by the beginning of period market capitalization. , is computed as the percentage dividend yield of stock j. , is the return on equity of stock j, , is the total leverage of firm j, and ℎ , are the total cash holdings of firm j divided by total assets.
[ Table I here]
C. Descriptive statistics
In WorldScope information on 36,660 stocks worldwide; we declare these stocks to be the world market portfolio for comparison purposes. 7,348 stocks are held by BGI funds prior to the merger (representing about 69% of world market capitalization), 6,476 stocks are held by BlackRock funds prior to the merger (representing about 65% of world market capitalization), and 5,497 stocks are held both by BlackRock and BGI funds prior to the merger (representing about 63% of world market capitalization), all according to the holdings that we can capture via FactSet. The global 7,348 stocks held by BGI funds prior to the merger form the main sample on which we perform our tests.
In panel B, we report average stock characteristics -i.e., market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, daily trading volume and return volatility -over the sample period from June 2008 to June 2010 for all the stocks covered in WorldScope, the stocks held by BGI funds, the stocks held by BlackRock funds, or the stocks held both by BGI and BlackRock funds. Comparing with an average stock in the complete WorldScope universe, we find that the stocks held by either BlackRock funds or BGI funds exhibit similar characteristics but are substantially larger, more heavily traded and somewhat less volatile compared to the average stock in WoldScope.
The average stock in the WoldScope universe has a market capitalization of $1.3 billion while the average stock held by BGI (BlackRock) funds has a market capitalization of $4.2 billion ($4.5 billion).
Likewise, the average WorldScope stock has a daily trading volume of $24 million while the stocks held by BGI or BlackRock funds are more heavily traded with an average daily volume of $70 million and $78 million respectively. For return volatility, the difference is not as pronounced. The average WorldScope has a daily return volatility of 4.1% while the average stock held by either BGI or BlackRock funds has a daily return volatility of about 3.5%-3.6%. So overall, our baseline sample of stocks is tilted towards global, liquid, large-cap stocks. For the sub-sample of stocks held by both BGI and BlackRock funds, we find that this universe is even more tilted towards large, liquid stocks. The average stock in that sample has a market capitalization of $5.0 billion and an average daily trading volume of $88 million.
In panel C, we provide descriptive statistics on the holdings coverage we can obtain for both
BlackRock and BGI funds as of June 2009, prior to the merger. For BlackRock, we are able to include 308 different investment funds in the sample. Out of these, only a small proportion is classified as "ETFs"
(30), the rest are classified as non-passive products (278), consistent with the perception that BlackRock was predominantly a manager of active investment products prior to the merger. This stands in contrast to BGI funds. We are able to include 333 BGI funds, 302 of which are classified as "ETFs" in FactSet and only 31 as non-ETFs underlining that BGI was (and is) primarily a manager of passive investment products.
In terms of assets under management ("AUM"), our coverage of BlackRock funds represents almost While we can capture the majority of BlackRock's equity AUM via FactSet, we only capture about a third of all BGI equity AUM via FactSet. Therefore, we verify this estimate using the 13F filings from Inspecting the time-series of Barclays AUM in 13F, we observe a drop in AUM of about $643 billion over the course of 2010 with an almost symmetric increase in AUM for BlackRock in the same period, suggesting that a large fraction of the reported Barclays AUM in 13F is indeed managed by BGI.
However, while the total AUM of Barclays in 13F is about twice as large as the AUM of BGI in FactSet, the number of distinct stocks that is covered in 13F is substantially smaller.
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By using 13F holdings, we are only able to cover 4,664 stocks with Barclays / BGI-ownership as of
June 2009 while our sample based on FactSet ownership covers over 7,300 stocks. The difference is primarily on the international dimension that we would lose when restricting ourselves to the 13F universe of stocks. In addition, we find that our measure of BGI-ownership from FactSet holdings is 75% correlated with the same measure constructed from 13F information in the overlapping sample of stocks covered by both data sources. This indicates that the difference in coverage mostly affects the level of institutional ownership. Consequently, we use the FactSet universe of ownership and stocks in our baseline analysis and we present robustness tests of the main results using 13F data in section V. Overall, we believe that our level of coverage is sufficiently broad to represent the changes in ownership concentration that have taken place due to the merger.
D. Empirical Design
The main empirical design we employ in this study is a difference-in-difference estimation with a continuous treatment variable. The unit of observation is a stock in a given time period and the treatment is defined as institutional ownership attributable to BGI funds prior to the merger -i.e., as of June 2009 in the baseline specification. In its most general form, we estimate the following model:
The variable , is the outcome variable of interest for stock j in period t. These include measures of residual institutional ownership, returns, liquidity, and volatility. The main explanatory variable is (1) is estimated at the semi-annual frequency because holdings are available only every six months. When the outcome variable is another stock characteristic, equation (1) is estimated at the monthly frequency.
The variable is a dummy (or a set of dummies) that indicate the different stages in the merger process. Depending on the test, we define these periods with different degrees of granularity. Specifically, to operationalize the timeline of events that led to the merger, we define a number of event periods that we use in our regression designs. Figure II summarizes these different stages in the merger process.
[Figure II here]
In section III, where we examine the portfolio decisions of institutions other than BlackRock and BGI and where we rely on semi-annual portfolio holdings, we use timelines 1 and 2 in the figure that are based on semi-annual observations. In the coarsest specification (timeline 1), we split the time-series into two equal parts in June 2009. We call the period prior to June 2009 the "Pre-merger" period and the period after the "Post-merger" period. We refine timeline 1 by splitting both the pre-and the post-merger periods in two equal parts. We label the period from June 2008 The main coefficient of interest in equation (1) First, we use the pre-merger value of this variable to capture the information that was likely available to market participants at the time in order to assess the impact of the change in ownership concentration that will take place once the merger completes. The institutional ownership attributable to BGI funds is perhaps the most direct estimate by how much the institutional ownership of BlackRock in stock j is going to increase after the merger.
Moreover, econometrically, the use of the pre-merger value of , is further desirable because the variable is pre-determined and does not vary with common, unobservable shocks to the outcome variable of stock j. This is especially useful in our analysis of peer effects in which the outcome variables are measures of institutional ownership that exclude the ownership attributable to BGI or BlackRock. As pointed out by Manski (1993) , regressing group behavior on individual behavior (or vice versa) gives rise to the reflection problem. Using a pre-determined regressor is one part of our strategy to address this problem (Angrist and Pischke (2008), section 4.6.2).
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As argued above, the most important part of our identification strategy is the exclusion restriction that BlackRock did not acquire BGI in order to increase its institutional ownership in the stocks common to BlackRock and BGI portfolios or in anticipation of the investment behavior of competing investors or the evolution of the stock characteristics that we examine. We believe that this is a plausible claim as the main driver of the acquisition was Barclays' need to raise capital and BlackRock's motive to enter the growing market for passive investment products (ETFs).
III. Peer Effects: The Responses of Institutional Investors to the Merger
The "fire sales risk hypothesis" predicts that institutions re-balance away from stocks that experience a large increase in ownership concentration to avoid any future exposure to idiosyncratic shocks to BlackRock (e.g., future fire sales). The alternative "information hypothesis" predicts that institutions rebalance towards affected stocks because the increased presence of BlackRock sends a positive signal about the quality of the firm. Therefore, we start by analyzing the investment responses of institutional investors to the BlackRock-BGI merger. Then, we investigate the cross-sectional variation of this behavior for different institutional investors. Finally, we analyze if and how the re-balancing activities in stocks held by BGI funds prior to the merger affects other stocks not held by BGI funds.
A. Peer Effects
Before estimating the full specification of equation (1), we start with a simple cross-sectional analysis, in which we regress changes in residual institutional ownership for each stock j over the second half of 2009 (June to December) on the level of institutional ownership attributable to BGI funds prior to the merger (i.e., as of June 2009), a set of control variables, as well as fixed effects.
[ Table II here]
The results are reported in table II, panel A. We find a strong negative correlation between the change in institutional ownership around the event and the level of BGI-ownership prior to the merger.
This holds across specifications and is robust to the inclusion of control variables (column 2), fixed effects (column 3) and different measures of residual institutional ownership (columns 4 and 5). These simple specifications already indicate significant economic peer effects in the investment behavior of institutional investors. The rate of change in the average portfolio weights of stocks falls by about 3.6
(column 3) to 4.7%-age points (column 4) points per STD of BGI-ownership prior to the merger. This leads to a fall in the growth rate or residual institutional ownership of 2%-age points per STD of BGIownership prior to the merger (column 5). This first result supports the "fire sales risk hypothesis" and suggests that the fear of future fire sales induces institutions to re-balance away from stocks that experience a large increase in ownership concentration due to the merger.
In panel B of table II, we estimate a full difference-in-difference specification of equation (1) In column 2, we add time fixed effects to the specification in column 1. In column 3, we also interact the country and industry fixed effects with the Post-Merger dummy in order to assess if the changes in the post-merger period are not stock-specific but country-or industry-specific. The results remain intact. In column 4, we replace the country and industry fixed effects by stock fixed effects and the results hold again. Taken together, these results suggest that our findings are not driven by generic differences across stocks, industries, countries or time periods. In column 5, when we use the flow-weighted measure of institutional ownership, we find a fall in the rate of change of average portfolio weight of 7.2%-age points per STD of BGI-ownership prior to the merger. Finally, column 6 shows that this translates into a 1.5%-age points lower growth rate of residual institutional ownership, significant at the 1%-level.
In panel C of table II, we re-estimate equation (1) using the more granular timeline 2 of figure II in order to better identify the period when the reduction in residual institutional ownership mostly takes place. Across all the specifications, we find that the interaction term IO BGI x Merger is negative and highly significant in all specifications. This is robust to different fixed effects specifications (columns 1 to 4) and different measures of residual institutional ownership (columns 5 and 6).
In the same panel, we test for reversals in institutional ownership by including the interaction term IO BGI x Completion. Any evidence of reversals in residual institutional ownership could imply that the documented effects are driven by e.g., front-running of competing institutions in anticipation of mergerrelated rebalancing of BlackRock (e.g., motivated by internal risk-management reasons). We find no evidence that the drop in residual institutional ownership reverses in the first six months of 2010, the interaction term IO BGI x Completion is either negative or insignificant. Therefore, front running of competing institutions in anticipation of possibly risk-management induced sales by BlackRock after merger do not seem to explain our results.
The full difference-in-difference estimates also confirm the economic magnitude of the effect. The rate of change in the average portfolio weights of stocks falls by about 4.1%-age points (column 4) per STD of BGI-ownership prior to the merger in the period June to December 2009. In column 5, when we use the flow-weighted measure of institutional ownership, we find that this decrease in the rate of change reaches up to 9.7%-age points per STD of BGI-ownership, indicating that institutions with volatile flows respond more aggressively to the event. Taken together, this leads to a fall in the growth rate or residual institutional ownership of 2.5%-age points per STD of BGI-ownership prior to the merger (column 6), significant at the 1%-level.
[ Table III here]
In table III, we perform a number of sample splits to assess the robustness of our results. We hypothesize that if institutions re-balance in order to avoid the risk of future fire sales, then the results of table II should be concentrated in the stocks that are also held by BlackRock funds prior to the merger. In columns 1 and 2, we indeed find such evidence. The effect is concentrated in stocks that are also held by BlackRock funds, there is no effect in stocks that are not held by BlackRock funds prior to the merger.
This is in line with our expectation that the effect on institutional investors is triggered by the increase in ownership concentration, not by the transfer of ownership.
In columns 3 and 4, we split the sample by the stocks in which BlackRock funds increased (did not increased) their position prior the merger. We do this to verify our exclusion restriction that BlackRock did not acquire BGI in anticipation of any capital market effects of the stocks held in BGI portfolios. We find that the effects are concentrated in the stocks that are not bought by BlackRock before the merger, which supports our exclusion restriction that BlackRock-BGI merger represents an exogenous event for identifying increase in ownership concentration.
We further split our sample on the basis of median stock liquidity (measured by stock turnover) or market capitalization. We expect that illiquid and small-cap stocks are more vulnerable to possible future fire sales. Therefore, the re-balancing of institutional ownership should be more pronounced for illiquid and small-cap stocks. And indeed, we find supporting evidence for this conjecture. The relative change in portfolio weights is concentrated in illiquid stocks with low stock turnover (column 5 and column 6) and in small-cap stocks (column 7 and column 8). These two splits further support the "fire sale risk
hypothesis" and are difficult to reconcile with the alternative "information hypothesis".
B. Heterogeneity in the Responses Across Different Institutions
In this subsection, we examine how different institutional investors respond to the increases in ownership concentration depending on their demand for liquidity, their investment horizon and their informedness. We expect that institutional investors who hold the affected stocks for liquidity reasons are more vulnerable to potential future fire sales and therefore respond more aggressively. Also, we expect informed investors to be less likely to re-balance away from affected stocks as it would mean giving up on their information.
To operationalize these conjectures, we define different measures to proxy for an investors' sensitivity to potential future fire sales, the investment horizon and the level of informedness. To capture institutional investors that have stronger demand for liquidity, we use two measures: fund-flow-volatility and flow-performance-sensitivity. Fund-flow-volatility is computed as the standard deviation of fund flows over the past 12 months. The flow-performance-sensitivity is estimated fund-by-fund by regressing monthly flows on lagged fund performance (in excess of the benchmark), squared lagged fund performance and standard fund controls. Our measure of flow-performance sensitivity is the coefficient on lagged fund performance from these regressions. 10 We conjecture that institutional investors with more volatile flows or whose investors are more likely to redeem shares due to bad performance place a greater emphasis to avoid the risk of future fire sales (Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2013) ). We therefore split institutions by the median on these two measures.
To capture the investment horizon, we follow Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005) We separate institutions into two groups based on the median value of their portfolio concentration.
[ Table IV here]
The results are presented in table IV. They show that institutional investors with higher fund-flowvolatility re-balance away more aggressively from the affected stocks. For institutional investors with above-median volatility of flows, the negative effect of BGI-ownership on changes in portfolio weights is more than twice as strong in the post-merger period compared to institutions with below-median volatility of flows. In columns 3 and 4, we split institutional investors by their flow-performance sensitivity to capture the same intuition. In line with our expectations, we find that institutional investors with high flow-performance sensitivity respond more aggressively to changes in ownership concentration in their portfolios. For such investors, the effect is over 50% stronger than for those with below-median levels of flow-performance sensitivity.
In the remaining columns, we split institutions on the basis of investment horizon and informedness.
In columns 5 and 6, we find that institutions with a long-term investment horizon have a marginally weaker response to changes in ownership concentration compared to short-term focused institutions. In columns 7 and 8, we find that the re-balancing effect is concentrated in the sample of institutions with less concentrated portfolios. Prior literature has shown how portfolio concentration is associated with superior performance and information. As such, this sample split is in line with the intuition that informed investors are less likely to give up their information on affected stocks.
C. Migration of Institutional Ownership
We now look at whether residual institutional ownership is re-allocated to comparable stocks that are not held by BGI funds prior to the merger. We perform this test for two reasons. First, many institutions have a mandate to stay invested. Therefore, re-balancing a position should lead to an offsetting action in the near future as institutional investors are unlikely to simply accumulate cash holdings. Second, many institutional investors are benchmarked to various market indices. Re-balancing a position could lead to a larger tracking error relative to the benchmark. To avoid an unwanted tracking error, the investor will need to reinvest the proceeds in a "similar" stock -i.e., one that that does not necessarily increase the tracking error with respect to the benchmark. For these reasons, we speculate that the documented peer effects of the previous subsections led to a migration of institutional ownership to comparable stocks.
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To identify such comparable stocks, we employ three different matching algorithms. All matching stocks come from the pool of stocks that are not held by any BGI fund prior to the merger (or are in the lowest decile of BGI's holdings). The first algorithm ("MATCH 1") matches every stock held by BGI funds prior to the merger with a corresponding stock from the same country of origin, within the same industry, and that is closest in market capitalization in the same month. The second algorithm ("MATCH 2") amends MATCH 1 by matching every stock held by BGI funds prior to the merger with a stock from the same country of origin, within the same industry, that is closest in terms of market capitalization and book-to-market using a distance measure. The third algorithm ("MATCH 3") amends MATCH 2 by adding the total institutional ownership in the distance measure to select the matching stock.
11
[ Table V are overwhelmingly positive and statistically significant across the three matches. The average difference in the rate of change of residual institutional ownership between matched stocks and BGI stocks ranges from 2.4 to 11.6%-age points.
Furthermore, the drastic differences between the two groups are mostly concentrated in the top quintile of actual BGI-ownership (i.e., the rows labelled "High BGI IO Quintile"). For those stocks, the differences range from 8 to 29%-age points, suggesting that institutional investors re-balance away more aggressively from stocks in the top quintile of BGI-ownership than from those in the bottom quintile of 11 The distance measure for MATCH 2 (MATCH 3) is computed as follows, = BGI-ownership (for which we detect no differences in the changes in residual institutional ownership).
The migration of institutional ownership is in line with the "fire sales risk hypothesis" and further rejects the alternative hypothesis that institutional investors re-balance towards stocks with high BGI-ownership due to a signaling effect.
IV. Stock Market Effects: Returns, Liquidity, and Volatility
In this section, we examine the effects of the BlackRock-BGI merger on the stock market. The peer effects we identify in the previous section are consistent with the "fire sales hypothesis". Under this hypothesis, the motive to re-balance away from stocks that experience an exogenous increase in ownership concentration due to the merger is driven by fear of future, idiosyncratic shocks to BlackRock (e.g., the risk of future fire sales). This should lead to a negative stock price reaction. Also, as argued above, both stock liquidity and volatility should decline. The alternative "information hypothesis" predicts the reverse effects.
We test these predictions by modifying equation (1) in three ways. First, we expand our panel to the monthly frequency since we can observe global stock characteristics at a higher frequency. Second, we employ the more granular monthly timeline 3 (see figure II) to more precisely capture the evolution of events. Third, we use as outcome variables measures of stock returns, liquidity, and volatility.
A. Return Effects
The first stock characteristics that we study are risk-adjusted returns. We ask if the strategic rebalancing away from affected stocks exerts negative price pressure on those stocks. To test the conjecture, we use risk-adjusted stock returns as dependent variable in equation (1). We adjust monthly stock returns by either subtracting domestic market returns (the variable Market-adjusted Stock Return), the return on a domestic size-value-momentum characteristic-matched benchmark portfolio (the variable DGTWadjusted Return) or the return on a domestic industry portfolio (the variable Market-Industry adjusted Return).
[ Table VI here]
We present the results in table VI. Panel A uses the full sample of stocks. We find a strong negative effect of the variable IO BGI in the months after the merger receives anti-trust approval (the coefficient on IO BGI x Anti-trust is highly significant and negative). The effect is robust to country and industry fixed effects (column 1), alternative stock fixed effects (column 2), as well as additional time fixed effects (columns 3 and 4). This again means we are not picking up general differences in returns across countries, industries, stocks, or time periods.
In column 5, we control for the impact of residual institutional ownership on stock returns throughout the merger. This is an important control because our main variable of interest IO BGI could simply be a noisy proxy for high overall institutional ownership in the stocks. If this were the case, the significance on the interaction terms should migrate to the newly added control variables. We find that this is not the case; the impact of the BlackRock-BGI merger on stock returns is robust.
In column 6, we test if the return effect is permanent in nature of if it reverts once the merger completes. We add to the specification the interaction term IO BGI x Completion to test for potential reversals in the period after the merger is completed. We find that returns do not significantly recover in the period after the merger.
In column 7, we use the full set of event indicators, starting from the initial Barclays announcement that the iShares unit is for sale up to the completion of the merger. Even this full set of controls does not change the result that returns of high BGI-ownership stocks are low in the months after the merger receives anti-trust approval from the European Commission.
Also, we find the effect not only statistically but also economically significant. From the estimates of column 7, 8, or 9, we estimate an abnormal negative risk-adjusted return of between 61 bps and 95 bps per month in the three months following the anti-trust approval per STD of BGI-ownership prior to the merger. This corresponds to a cumulative abnormal negative return of up to 3% over a three-month period that does not fully revert in the months following the completion of the merger.
In panel B of table VI, we present the same sample splits as above. The negative return effect is entirely concentrated in stocks that were held by BlackRock funds prior to the merger (column 1 and column 2), is present for stocks bought or not bought by BlackRock funds prior to the merger (columns 3 and 4) but almost twice as strong in illiquid stocks (columns 5 and 6) and 30% stronger in small-cap vs large-cap stocks (columns 7 and 8).
B. Liquidity Effects
We now turn to the effect of the merger on stock liquidity. As baseline measure of stock liquidity we use the Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity that we construct using daily stock returns and trading volume data. Alternatively, we use variable Turnover, defined as the total number of shares traded of stock j in month t divided by beginning-of-month shares outstanding, or the log of total monthly dollar trading volume in stock j in month t (the variable Log Trading Volume).
[ Table VII here] In panel B of table VII, we perform the same sample splits as before. In columns 1 and 2, we split the sample on pre-merger institutional ownership attributable to BlackRock funds. We find that the deterioration in stock liquidity is only present in stocks for which there is overlap in the pre-merger portfolios of BlackRock and BGI funds and for which ownership concentration effectively increased as a result of the merger. For stocks not held by BlackRock funds prior to the merger, we find no effect on stock liquidity. In columns 3 and 4, we split the sample by the stocks in which BlackRock funds increased their position prior the merger. We find a negative liquidity effect in both subsamples. In the remaining columns, we split the sample into high and low liquidity stocks (columns 5 and 6) and small-and largecap stocks (columns 7 and 8) with again stronger effects for small-cap and less liquid stocks.
C. Volatility Effects
Finally, we turn to the third stock characteristic: volatility. Under the "fire sales risk hypothesis", stock volatility should decrease following the merger because of a lower presence of liquidity traders that re-balance away from the stock more than informed investors. The market microstructure literature suggests that this leads to lower volatility.
[ Table VIII here]
We present the result in table VIII. Columns 1 to 5 in panel A use as dependent variable Volatility, defined as the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the month, while columns 6 to 9 use Idiosyncratic Volatility, defined as the standard deviation of residuals from a regression of daily excess stock returns on domestic market, size, value and momentum factors.
As in the previous subsection, the results support the "fire sale risk hypothesis". Volatility declines markedly throughout the merger process, and especially once BlackRock enters the picture in the second half of 2009. This is consistent with the effect described in the market microstructure literature that links stock volatility to the presence of liquidity traders and to our results in section III that show a decrease in residual institutional ownership that is especially strong for institutions and funds with characteristics of such liquidity traders. The specifications we present mirror the ones of the previous subsection. The negative effect of the merger on the volatility of stocks that experience an exogenous increase in ownership concentration is robust to the inclusion of fixed effects (country, industry, stock, or time), to controlling for residual institutional ownership, possible reversals after the merger is completed, the granular definition of the event timeline and to both measures of stock volatility.
The economic effect associated with the estimates in panel A is again economically sizeable. From the estimates of column 5 (9), we estimate a 0.03 STDs (0.07 STDs) decrease in volatility (idiosyncratic volatility) in the months after the merger receives anti-trust approval per STD of BGI-ownership prior to the merger. However, the effect is already detectable in the two months prior to that when BlackRock announces its offer to buy BGI.
In panel B of table VII, we present the same sample splits as in the previous table and find the same patterns. The effect is concentrated in the stocks also held by BlackRock funds prior to the merger, is present in both stocks that BlackRock funds bought or sold prior to the merger and is stronger in illiquid and small-cap stocks.
V. Discussion and Robustness Tests
In this section, we present two additional robustness tests and further discuss our results. First, we implement the main tests using alternative institutional ownership information from 13F filings as indicated in section II. Second, we exploit the fact that our measure of BGI-ownership relies primarily on passive holdings of iShares funds. This allows us to implement a more conservative specification in which we define BGI-ownership as of June 2008, a full year prior to BlackRock's offer for BGI.
A. Replication using 13F ownership information
As discussed in section II, we construct alternative proxies for institutional ownership due to BlackRock or BGI funds using 13F filings. However, doing so has a few drawbacks. filings include all institutional holdings (including special and institutional accounts) while FactSet mostly covers the holdings of iShares funds and a few active products.
However, as indicated in section II, we find that our measure of BGI-ownership constructed from 13F filings is 75% correlated with the same measure constructed from FactSet holdings. So the difference between the two is largely in the level of ownership, suggesting that there is no systematic bias in the composition ownership conditional on the stocks covered in 13F.
[ Table IX here]
We present the results based on this alternative data source in table IX. We present estimates on the overlapping sample between the universe of stocks we capture via FactSet and the universe we capture via 13F (3,299 of stocks or about 82% of the market cap of the 13F sample of BGI-held stock as of June 2009). 12 We find that all our main conclusions hold.
B. Defining BGI-ownership as of June 2008
In our second robustness tests, we exploit a benefit of the holdings information from FactSet. Since we capture primarily the BGI-ownership due to iShares ETFs and since these ETFs are largely passive, we compute the institutional ownership attributable to BGI funds as of June 2008 for each stock and hold the measure constant for every stock throughout the entire sample period. We do this because the portfolio composition of ETFs is fairly stable over time. Therefore, inflows or outflows into ETFs will change the level of BGI-ownership but will have little impact on the cross-sectional variation of the variable. This means that even a longer lag of BGI-ownership can serve as proxy for the changes in ownership concentration that took place because of the merger. In addition, using BGI-ownership as of June 2008, a full year prior to BlackRock's announcement to purchase BGI, addresses any residual concerns that unobservable common shocks could impact both our outcome and explanatory variables.
[ Table X here]
We present these robustness tests in 
VI. Conclusion
We study how the investment behavior of institutional investors is affected by their strategic reaction to changes in the degree of ownership concentration and how this affects the stock market. We argue that investors are careful to hold stocks with concentrated ownership as these expose them to idiosyncratic shocks of the large owner. Such positions expose investors to the risk of future fire sales. This precautionary behavior is particularly pronounced for liquidity-driven investors who have a stronger motive to re-balance away from such stocks. This leads to lower stock prices, liquidity, and volatility.
We test this hypothesis using the acquisition of Barclays Global Investors by BlackRock as an event that exogenously changes the degree of ownership concentration in the global cross-section of stocks. We provide evidence consistent with strategic investment behavior and its associated impact on the stock market. Residual institutional ownership for stocks with a large increase in ownership concentration due to the merger drops after the merger relative to other stocks and migrates to otherwise comparable stocks.
The same stocks also experience a decline in returns, liquidity, and volatility.
Our results have important implications because they clarify the impact of concentrated ownership on stock markets and because they suggest that large asset managers may have systemic risk implications.
Our results suggest that the presence of large asset managers can reduce stock volatility at the expense of lowering liquidity.
FIGURE I: STOCK RETURNS IN EVENT TIME
This figure presents the evolution of cumulative stock returns of stocks held by BGI funds prior to the merger. Daily stock returns are adjusted by subtracting the return on the domestic market portfolio. 
FIGURE II: TIMELINE OF THE BLACKROCK-BGI MERGER
This figure presents the timeline of the evolution of the merger between BlackRock and BGI. Depending on the frequency of the data used in the different tables, we use 3 different timelines that differ in the degree of granularity and the level of detail. Timeline 1 is the coarsest timeline and only splits the event window in a "Pre-" and a "Post-Merger" period as of June 2009. Timeline 2 is more granular and considers every semi-annual period in the event window separately. Both the pre-and the post-merger period are split into equal parts. The pre-merger period is separated into the "Pre-CVC" and the "CVC" periods, the post-merger period is separated into the "Merger" and "Completion" period. Timeline 3 is the most granular one and used in all regressions that are run at monthly frequency. Timeline 3 takes detailed account of the evolution of events month by month. We define the "Pre- 
TABLE II: INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP CHANGES AROUND THE BLACKROCK-BGI MERGER
This table presents regressions of changes in institutional ownership at the stock level around the BlackRock-BGI merger. The sample includes all stocks that are held by at least one BGI fund prior to the merger. Panel A presents a single cross-sectional regression where the dependent variables are different measures of changes in institutional ownership of institutions excluding BlackRock or BGI (and their affiliates) over the second half of 2009 (June to December). The dependent variables are defined as follows: Change Avg. Port. Weight is the average change in the portfolio weight of the stocks across all funds from institutions different from BlackRock or BGI (and their affiliates) in the FactSet database. The average is weighted either by the TNA of the fund or by fund flow volatility. Change Residual IO is the change in residual institutional ownership of the stock. Residual institutional ownership is defined as total institutional ownership excluding the institutional ownership associated with BlackRock or BGI funds. The main explanatory variable is (Pre-Merger) IO BGI which is the level of institutional ownership in the stock attributable to BGI funds prior to the merger with BlackRock (i.e., as of June 2009). Additional control variables include Change IO BlackRock, defined as changes in portfolio weight of the stocks across all Blackrock funds, Change MCap as the change in portfolio weight of the stock in the global market portfolio that includes all the stocks in the WorldScope database for a given month, Log MCap as the log of beginning of period market capitalization of the stock, Pastreturn as the 6-month trailing stock return, Log BTM as the log of the book-to-market ratio, Dividend Yield as the percentage dividend yield of the stock, ROE as the return on equity, Leverage as total leverage, and Cash as the total cash holdings divided by total assets. Panel B presents a difference-in-difference specification using a semi-annual panel including four semi-annual periods: 2 periods before the event and 2 periods after the event (timeline 1 in figure II) . In panel B, the variable Post-Merger is a dummy that equals one for the post-merger period in the regression and the variable of interest is the interaction between (Pre-merger) IO BGI and Post-Merger. Panel C uses the more granular timeline 2 of figure II. The variable CVC is a dummy equal to 1 for the period December 2008 to June 2009 in which Barclays announces that iShares is for sale and in which the deal with CVC Capital Partners in announced, the variable Merger is a dummy equal to 1 for the period June 2009 to December 2009 in which BlackRock offers to buy BGI and receives Anti-trust approval and the variable Completion is a dummy equal to 1 for the period December 2009 to the end of the sample in which the merger is completed. The regressions include unreported interactions between the different event indicators and the remaining control variables (including interactions between the event indicators and the industry or country fixed effects) as indicated at the bottom of the panels. The use of fixed effects is indicated in every panel, * / ** / *** indicate statistical significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% level respectively, computed from standard errors that allow for clustering at the country-industry level in panel A and at the country-industry-period level in panels B and C. This table presents sample splits of the regression presented in table II , panel B, column 3 based on stock characteristics. In column 1(2), the sample includes only stocks that are also held (not held) by BlackRock funds prior to the merger with BGI. In column 3(4), the sample includes only stocks in which BlackRock funds increased (did not increase) their holdings in the period prior to the merger with BGI. In column 5(6), the sample includes stocks with above (below) monthly turnover in sample and in column 7(8), the sample includes stocks with above (below) median market capitalization in sample. All regression include unreported control variables, country, industry and time fixed effects as well as interactions between Post-Merger and the control variables, the country and the industry fixed effects. * / ** / *** indicate statistical significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% level respectively, computed from standard errors that allow for clustering at the country-industry-period level. This table presents sample splits of the regression presented in table II , panel B, column 3 based on fund characteristics. In column 1(2), the dependent variable is computed using only funds with above-median (below-median) volatility of flows to proxy for the likely impact of future idiosyncratic shocks in stocks held. In column 3(4), the dependent variable is computed using only funds with above-median (below-median) flow-performance sensitivity as an alternative proxy for the likely impact of future idiosyncratic shocks in stocks held. In column 5(6), the dependent variable is computed using only funds with short (long) investment horizon based on the definition of Yan and Zhang (2009) who use portfolio turnover to measure the investment horizon. In column 7(8), the dependent variable is computed using only funds with above-median (below-median) portfolio concentration to proxy for how informed the institutions are. All regression include unreported control variables, country, industry and time fixed effects as well as interactions between Post-Merger and the control variables, the country and the industry fixed effects. * / ** / *** indicate statistical significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% level respectively, computed from standard errors that allow for clustering at the country-industry-period level. Three different algorithms to select a matching stock are considered. All matching stocks come from the pool of stocks that are not held by any BGI fund prior to the merger (or are in the lowest decile of BGI's holdings). MATCH 1 matches every stock held by BGI funds prior to the merger with a corresponding stock from the same country of origin, within the same industry, that is closest in market capitalization. MATCH 2 amends MATCH 1 by matching every stock held by BGI funds prior to the merger with a stock from the same country of origin, within the same industry, that is closest in terms of market capitalization and book-to-market using a distance measure defined in the text. MATCH 3 amends MATCH 2 by also considering the total institutional ownership in the distance measure to select the matching stock. Cells in the columns entitled "Actual Stock" display the average semi-annual change in the measure of institutional ownership for the actual stock held by at least one BGI fund between June and December 2009. The columns entitled "Matched Stock" display the same average change for the matching stocks and the columns entitled "Match -Actual" test the difference between the two changes. For every measure of institutional ownership, we test these differences for all BGI-held stocks, for the quintile of lowest BGI ownership and the quintile of highest BGI ownership. * / ** / *** indicate statistical significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% level respectively (p-values reported). 
Panel A: Single cross-sectional regression around the merger event (semi-annual holdings)
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TABLE III: INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP CHANGES AROUND THE BLACKROCK-BGI MERGER -SAMPLE SPLITS BY STOCK CHARACTERISTICS
TABLE IV: INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP CHANGES AROUND THE BLACKROCK-BGI MERGER -SAMPLE SPLITS BY INSTITUTION CHARACTERISTICS
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